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Abstract 
This paper empirically tests the effects of Anti-Dumping (AD) protection on 
the price-cost margin of fIrms.  To this end, we use a rich panel data set of 1,666 EU 
producers that were involved in AD cases initiated in 1996. Our [mdings indicate that 
price-cost margins  in most cases  significantly increase in the period of protection 
compared to a period before protection. In industries where competition is very tough 
before protection, we fail to find an increase in price-cost margins, while in industries 
with positive markups before protection, trade policy raises market power between 
3%  points  and  15  %  points,  depending  on  the  sector.  Our results  are  robust  to 
alternative  specifications  and  estimation  techniques,  controlling  for  unobservable 
fixed  effects  and  potential  endogeneity  of the  regressors.  Our  findings  are  also 
consistent with recent theoretical models that deal with the economic effects on price 
behaviour in response to AD protection. 
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comments. I.  Introduction 
Over  the  last  two  decades  consecutive  multilateral  trade  talks  of the 
GATT/WTO have resulted in a general reduction of  tariffs, voluntary export restraints 
and quotas. At the same time a rise in new forms of  trade protection has occurred, in 
particular the use of antidumping (AD) measures has increased rapidly. Blonigen and 
Prusa (2001) indicate in a recent review of  the literature that since 1980 GATTIWTO 
members have filed more complaints under the AD statute than under all other trade 
laws combined. Moreover, an increased number of  AD duties are now levied in any 
one year worldwide than were levied in the entire period 1947-1970. 
A number of papers have  shown that trade  liberalization has a disciplining 
effect on firms'  pricing behavior. Levinsohn (1993) for Turkey and Harrison (1994) 
for Chile estimate the effects of trade liberalization on price mark-ups and find that 
mark-ups  mostly  go  down  after trade  liberalization.  A  similar result  is  found  by 
Krishna and  Mitra (1998)  for  India.  Finally,  Botasso  and  Sembenelli  (2001)  find 
evidence that the introduction of the EU  single market program, which implied the 
removal of non-tariff barriers within the EU, has led to a reduction of  market power, 
but only in  the  so called  'sensitive'  sectors.  All these  papers have looked at what 
happens to market power when trade liberalization takes place.  However, given the 
enormous increase in the use  of AD  actions  it is interesting to  analyze the reverse 
question:  What  happens  to  firms'  market  power once  protection  is  achieved.  If 
protection were  granted to  firms  that operate  in perfectly competitive markets, we 
would not expect protection to  increase market power. However, a number of recent 
theoretical papers have shown that the antidumping legislation (AD) in imperfectly 
competitive industries can  give  rise to  strategic price setting behavior of domestic 
2 firms which may result in increased market power of  domestic firms.! This paper tests 
empirically whether AD protection gives rise to an increase in market power. For this 
purpose we use firm  level data of European Union firms  to  estimate the price-cost 
ratios before and after receiving AD protectiOli:  Our findings suggest that price-cost 
margins are significantly higher during the protection period compared to the period 
before the protection. This result is robust to  alternative econometric specifications 
and  estimation techniques.  It is robust to potential business  cycle  effects  that may 
affect the price-cost margins of  firms,. it is also robust to the inclusion of  fixed effects 
which capture other variables that are likely to  have an effect on price-cost margins 
like technology, or the amount of sunk costs or advertising outlays at the firm level. 
This finding also remains the same when we control for potential endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables by using IV GMM estimation techniques. 
The rest of  the paper is structured as follows. Section IT discusses the effect of 
antidumping  measures  on  domestic  prices  as  predicted  by the  literature.  It will 
become  clear  that  antidumping  measures  are  likely  to  push  domestic  prices  up 
irrespective of the mode of competition that is considered.  Section III explains the 
econometric  methodology  and the data that we use.  ill section IV we  discuss  our 
findings and section V is a concluding one. 
II.  Theoretical background 
An antidumping duty is very similar to a tariff and we know that the positive 
effect  of tariffs  on  prices  is  very  robust  across  a  very wide  range  of oligopoly 
specifications  (Helpman and Krugman,  1989).  Simply consider what happens  in  a 
1 Fischer (1992), Reitzes (1993), Prusa (1994), Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999), Pauwels, 
Vandenbussche and Weverbergh (2001) among others. 
3 duopoly model with a home  and  a foreign  firm.  A duty on foreign imports  when 
competition is  in strategic complements results in an increase of the domestic price 
(Brander,  1995).  Hence, duty protection implies that the home price will be higher 
under protection than under free  trade.  The same result holds under competition in 
strategic  substitutes  (Cournot)  competition.  A duty on foreign imports  results  in a 
higher output for the protected domestic firm and a lower output for the foreign firm. 
It can be shown that the drop in foreign output is larger than the increase in domestic 
output, resulting in a higher domestic price after duty protection. This gives us a clear 
prediction for  our empirical work.  Based on the theory we then expect to  [rod that 
European firms  when protected by antidumping duties2  have an increase in market 
The models described above  are however static in nature.  fu recent years a 
number  of dynamic  models  have  been developed,  taking  into  account  that  firms 
involved  in  antidumping  cases  may  have  incentives  to  behave  strategically  to 
influence  antidumping  outcomes  (Ethier  and  Fischer,  1987;  Reitzes,  1993;  Prusa, 
1994; Vandenbussche et al.  2001).  This implies that in the period before protection, 
prices can differ from what they would be under free trade. Empirical predictions on 
how prices are  to  move in the  period just before protection are not straightforward 
since  some  models  predict  a  pro-competitive  effect  while  others  predict  an 
anticompetitive effect, depending on whether strategic substitutes or complements are 
assumed and depending on how the duty is  determined.  fu contrast,  second period 
results, when antidumping measures  are  actually imposed, are the same in .all these 
2 In the EU, antidumping measures can either take the form of  a duty or of  a price-undertaking. While a 
duty  is  like  a  tariff,  a  price-undertaking  is  a  voluntary  price  increase  by the  importers.  Price-
undertakings are believed to induce collusion and raise market power (Belderbos et aI, 2002). 
3  A few  exceptions exist with respect to  this  general result.  When demand is  very convex, Cournot 
reaction functions  can become upward sloping and the  effect of a tariff on domestic prices can be 
different than the one described here. Also, a few papers have shown that tariff and quota protection in 
4 models namely, domestic prices go up vis-a.-vis free trade when a duty is imposed. It 
is on this result that we focus in the empirical analysis. 
One additional remark is in order here. So far we have discussed the effects of 
trade policy under a fixed number of firms.  The question can be raised what would 
happen to market power when trade policy would trigger entry. A number of papers 
have argued that in general when entry is free, the effects of  commercial policy can be 
dampened by entry and exit (Head and Ries,  1999; Markusen and Venables,  1988). 
The rate of entry is a function of how much it costs to  get into or out of a certain 
industry. Sunk cost are an important entry-barrier. Therefore it can be expected that 
especially in industries where sunk costs are large, trade policy is likely to have larger 
effects than  in industries with free  entry as  shown by Bernard and Jensen (1999). 
However,  in this paper we  do  not want to  engage in discussing  or explaining the 
different  levels  of market  power  we  observe  in  different  industries  even  before 
protection  takes  place.  The  question  of interest  here  is  whether  we  observe  a 
significant change in market power after antidumping protection sets in and can we 
absolutely sure that antidumping policy is the explanatory variable accountable for 
that change. 
HI.  Empirical Methodology and Data 
III. 1. Methodology 
Our methodology is  based Roeger  (1995),  which starts  from  the  approach 
introduced  by  Hall  (1988,  1990)  to  estimate  price-cost  margins.  Under  constant 
returns to scale in production, assuming two input factor, labor and capital,  the primal 
a  dynamic  context  under  certain  conditions  can  result  in  more  competition  rather  than  less  CR. 
Deneckere and C. Davidson, 1985 and J. Rotemberg and G. Saloner, 1989) 
5 Solow residual (SR) can be related to price over marginal cost (Il=PIMC).  Using 
lower case letters to denote natural logarithms we can write the primal SR as 
SRit = b..qit-a,Mit-(l-a,)b..kit = (pit-l}a,(Mit-b..kit)+()it  (1) 
where subscript i stands for firm i , subscript t stands for time t, q, 1 and k stand for the 
natural logarithm of  output, employment and capital, a,  is labor's share in output and 
()  is the Hicks-neutral rate of technical progress. A  similar expression as (1) can be 
obtained for the dual Solow residual (DSR) or 
DSRit =  a,b..wit - (1-a, )b..r;t -Ilpit =  (Pit -1)a,  (b..Wit - b..rit) +  ()it  (2) 
where w  and r  are the natural  logarithms of the wage rate and the rental price of 
capital and Pit is the price of firm i in period t.  The problem with estimating (1) and 
(2) is that the explanatory variables are correlated with the unobservable  productivity 
shocks «()).  However, by subtracting (2)  from  (1)  these unobservable productivity 
shocks cancel out, which leaves us with an equation with only observable variables 
which can be interpreted as a Solow residual in nominal terms (NSR) or 
NSRit = b..(pit + qit) -a,b..(wit +  lit) -(1-a,)b..(rit + kit) =  (pit-l)a/[b..(wit+ lit) -b..(rid kit)] 
(3) 
These equations can easily be extended to incorporate material inputs M (e.g.  Basu 
and Fernald, 1995; Martins and Scarpetta, 1999) or 
6 NSRit = A(pit + qit) - a,A(Wit + lit) - amA(pmit + mit) - (1-a, - am )A(rit + kit) 
= (.wt -l)[a,A(wit +  lit) + amA(pmit + mit) - (a, + aJA(rit + kit)] 
or this can be written as 
(4) 
where  pmit  and m stand for the price of material inputs and the log of  material inputs 
M  respectively and  am  is  the share of material inputs in total output.  The Roeger 
(1995) method is particularly well suited if one has access to company accounts data 
where both output and input factors  are reported in nominal values.  Deflation of 
variables  using price indexes  is  no  longer needed in order to estimate price cost 
margins. In addition, the Roeger (1995) method overcomes a problem, inherent to the 
Hall (1988) model, that the explanatory variables are correlated with the unobservable 
productivity shocks in the error term of  the Hall specification. By subtracting the dual 
(2) from the primal Solow residual (1), the productivity term has cancelled out which 
can be seen in expression (3).  Testing for market power on the basis of the Roeger 
(1995) specification implies that the use of  instrumental variables is no longer needed 
to get consistent estimates. 
Martins and  Scarpetta (1999)  derive the nominal  Solow residual  using an 
alternative approach allowing for increasing or decreasing returns to scale to illustrate 
that an estimation of  equation (5) will give a price cost margin which is a lower bound 
to the true one if  there are increasing returns to scale in production. 
7 Equation (5) shows that in order to obtain an estimate of  the price cost margin 
(J.I.), we need information on sales growth4, growth in the wage bill, growth in material 
costs and growth in the value of capital. The company accounts information we have 
allowed us to get finn level  data on these vanables.  The profit and  loss  account 
provided us the information on sales, the wage bill and material costs in consecutive 
years.5 For capital we used the book value of  the capital stock from the balance sheet, 
for the rental price of  capital (Rit) we followed Hall (1990) and Martins and Scarpetta 
(1999) where 
(6) 
where  PI  stands for the index of investment goods prices, measured at the country 
level,  R1  stands  for  the  real  interest  rate  in  each  country  and  8  stands  for  the 
depreciation  rate,  measured  at  the  firm  level  (see  data  appendix  for  details  on 
sources). 
For empirical tractability we further need to make the assumption, as is done 
in all applications of this type (see Levinsohn, 1993  for further arguments) that the 
price cost margins are the same for all firms within the same sector. It is not possible 
to estimate for each finn separately a price cost margin because we would have too 
many degrees of freedom.  We further want to test whether the price cost margins 
differ before protection versus after protection or in terms of  equation (5) we will split 
up our price cost margin in two parts, the average price cost margin before protection, 
4  /).xii  AYit 
Note that - +--=  Aln(x)it + Aln(Y)il = Aln(XY)it  which is the growth rate ofxy. 
Xii  yit 
5 The Profit & Loss account for European finns can be compared to the Income Statement for US 
finns. 
8 i.e.  the years  1991-96 and the average price cost margin during protection, which 
starts one year after the initiation of  an AD case, i.e. the years 1997-99. 
Our  testable  equation  to  estimate  whether  mark-ups  are  affected  after 
protection is given in equation (7) below. This equation is derived from reWriting (5). 
In particular, we reWrite the left-hand side of (5) as  dYit  and the term in brackets on 
the right hand side as  dxit • In equation (7) the dependent variable dYit represents the 
growth rate in sales per value of  capital and is an indicator of  firm level productivity. 
The explanatory variable dxit is a composite variable that represents the growth rates 
in the various values of the input factors weighted by their respective share in total 
sales. This composite variable dxit is interacted in (7) with a dummy equal to 1 for the 
years during which antidumping protection applies (from 1997 onwards) in order to 
capture the change in markups as a result of protection. In addition we also interact 
dxit with yearly GDP growth per country j to control for changes in price-cost margins 
due to business cycle fluctuations, demand and time effects. 
(7) 
In (7) we include ai which represents an unobservable fIrm level fIxed effect that may 
be correlated with the explanatory variables.  We introduce such a  fIrm  level fIxed 
effect to control for fIrm heterogeneity which is usually prevalent in micro data. These 
fIxed effects may also control unobservable fIrm  level technology shocks, for sunk 
costs and other fIrm and sector characteristics that are fIxed over time. In (7)  J-l,  is the 
price-cost ratio  (p/MC) before protection, while  J-l,  is the change in the price-cost 
ratio during anti-dumping protection which is our main interest; the total price cost 
9 margin during protection is  equal to  111  +  112'  The change the price-cost ratio due to 
business cycle fluctuations is captured by  11,;  /31  and /32' measure the direct impact of 
AD-protection and GDP growth on firm level productivity growth and  If/it is a white 
noise error term. Equation (7) will be estimated using different estimation techniques. 
m.2. Data 
The  company  accounts  information  of the  European  firms  affected  by 
European  antidumping  cases  were  derived  from  the  Amadeus  database.  This  is  a 
commercial database covering all medium and large sized European companies. The 
company accounts data in Amadeus run from 1991 to 1999. In view of  the time period 
covered in the Amadeus dataset, we decided to  focus on AD-initiations in 1996. By 
looking at antidumping initiations in 1996, for each case we have a number of annual 
observations before each case initiation and  a number of annual observations after 
each initiation. This allows us to study market power in the period before protection 
and in the period during which antidumping protection actually applies. In particular, 
we want to test whether price-cost margins of domestic firms are affected once they 
receive protection from foreign competitors through the Anti-Dumping legislation. A 
total of 15 antidumping cases were initiated in the course of 1996. These cases are all 
reported in the Official Journal reports of  the European Commission. In 9 of  those 15 
cases, we found a sufficient number of European producers for which we could trace 
all the information required. This resulted in a total of 1,666 EU firms.  These 9 cases 
are listed in Table 1 together with the decision that was taken by the ED Commission 
in  each  case.  We  note  that  all  but  one  case was  decided  with  a duty  on foreign 
imports.  In  the  Farmed  Atlantic  Salmon  case,  many  importers  accepted  price-
10 undertakings but for those that did not, a duty was imposed. The remaining 6 cases 
initiated in 1996  could not be fully traced for  one  of the following three reasons. 
Either the name of the EU firms filing for protection was not mentioned in the case 
reports in the Official Journal. Or, in some cases where we had the niunes of  the EU 
firms involved, we could not trace these firms in our company accounts data set. A 
final reason was that often the product definition was too wide to allow us a search via 
CSO code or name, the classification system used in Amadeus (see below). In the 
group of 6 cases where we did not have enough information, only one resulted in a 
duty  (handbags),  while  4  other  cases  were  terminated  without  protection 
(Dihydrostreptomycin;  Luggage  &  travel  goods;  Briefcases  &  Schoolbags;  Video 
Tapes)  and  in  a  last  case  (pocket  lighters),  we  failed  to  [md  the  Commission's 
decision in the Official Journal. 
In order to compose our sample of firms  for which we are relatively certain 
they would be affected by antidumping protection we proceeded in various steps. We 
first traced the companies that were mentioned in the filing of a case reported in the 
Official Journal. The number of ED firms involved in the filing of the complaint to 
the ED is given in the last column of  Table 1. We identified their 7 digit CSO activity 
code,  the  classification  used  in  the  Amadeus  company  accounts  dataset6, 
corresponding to  the product that  was  under  the  AD  investigation.  However,  the 
sample  of firms  involved  in  the  formulation  of the  antidumping  complaint  was 
relatively small. To expand our sample ofEU firms we used an interesting property of 
the antidumping legislation, which is that when protection is granted, it does not only 
apply to the firms that actually filed a complaint but it applies to all firms in the EU 
producing that particular product. This allowed us to increase our sample by searching 
6 The eso code is an activity code that is used by the British Statistical Office and defmes the 
activities of  £inns at a 7  -digit level of  detail. 
11 for all EU firms that were likely to benefit from AD-protection. A search for all EU 
firms  producing  the  same  7-digit  CSO  code  as  the  finns  in  our  initial  sample 
increased  the  sample  but  still  resulted in a  relatively small  number  of firms.  To 
increase  the  sample  more,  we  identified  from  our  initial  sample  of firms,  the 
corresponding  four-digit  primary  CSO  activity  codes7.  This  corresponds  with  an 
aggregation within the product line. We retrieved all firms  that are classified in the 
corresponding  four  digit CSO  activity primary codes  (see  data appendix  for  more 
detail).  This way we were able to have a sufficiently large sample of ED firms that 
were producing the product under protection or a close substitute and were getting 
protection. We then retrieved the company accounts of all these firms between 1991 
and 1999. Table 1 shows for each case we considered, the final decision of  the EU in 
column  1, the share of imports of the extra-ED countries that are named in the AD 
investigation as alleged dumpers in column 2, the number of  ED finns that we used in 
our estimations in column 3 and the number of  initiating EU finns in column 4. 
We note that in all but one case,  the EU Commission imposed a duty after 
initiation. Only the case involving 'Synthetic Fiber Ropes' was 'terminated' without 
protection. While we were able to trace more finns than reported in table 1, a number 
of  firms did not report all the information we required for our estimation (sales, wage 
bill, materials, capital).  8 
7 By turning to the primary CSO codes, we only include firms in our sample for who the product 
belongs to their main activity. 
8 We did not deflate the time series of nominal values of output and input factors  we used for two 
reasons. First, balance sheet items like fixed tangible assets (K) are reported at historic cost, excluding 
inflation. Profit and Loss (income statement) items like material costs could be subject to inflation but 
12 Table 1: European antidumping (AD) Cases initiated in 1996 
Product  Decision  Import  share  Number  of  Number  of 
dumpers a  ED  firms  in  initiating firms 
values  tons  fmalsample 
Artificial Corundum  Duty  14%  25% 
Cotton Fabrics  Duty  60%  63% 
Synthetic Fiber Robes  Tenmnation  25%  32% 
Farmed Atlantic  DutylPrice- 93%  93% 
Salmon  Undertaking 
Seamless Steel Pipes  Duty  53%  64% 
and Tubes 
Polyester Fibers  Duty  38%  43% 
Yarns 
Bed Linen  Duty  51%  59% 
Stainless Steel  Duty  85%  84% 
Fasteners 
Ferro-silicon- Duty  26%  30% 
manganese 
Total 
e)  import values (tonnes) of alleged dumping country(ies) 





















This was especially problematic for two cases namely 'Bed Linen' and 'Ferro-
silico  manganese'  for  which we could only trace full  information for  6 European 
firms.  Therefore we excluded the market power results for  'Bed Linen' and 'Ferro-
silicon manganese' in the case-by-case results because, although the results confirm 
an increase in market power for the European firms involved, we did not find these 
results  reliable in view of the limited number of observations.  However,  we have 
included  the  data  in these  two  cases  for  the  estimates  where  we pool  all  cases 
inflation in the nineties in Europe was  very low.  Second, nominal values enter both the left and the 
right hand side of  our regression affecting variables on each side of  the expression in the same fashion. 
13 together. Noteworthy is also the fact that for all cases the import shares of  the alleged 
dumping countries, the so-called 'named' countries, is fairly large. 
A  number  of further  remarks  are  in  order  here.  First,  our  sample  may 
underestimate the total number of firms  producing the product under iIivestigation. 
The reason is that some finns may be producing the product in question but not as 
their main activity.  Finns that produce the product not as  their main activity were 
excluded from our sample although it is clear that those finns enjoyed protection too. 
Second, our estimates of  the change in price-cost ratios are likely to be a lower bound 
of  the true effect for the following reason. We do not have infonnation on the relative 
importance of  the product under investigation in the total product portfolio of a finn. 
The company accounts that we use refer to the firm's total operations and not to the 
financial  flows  associated  with  the  production  of  the  single  product  under 
investigation. This suggests that if  we find any effect of AD on firm's market power 
that it is most likely to be a lower bound of  the true effect. Thirdly, our sample based 
on  case initiations  in 1996  mostly contains  duty cases.  This  is rather coincidental 
since we know that the ED next to duties is also a heavy user of price-undertakings, 
which  can be  seen  as  price-fixing  agreements  between  the  Commission  and  the 
foreign importer. The only case in which price-undertakings were imposed together 
with duties was Farmed Atlantic Salmon. The case involving Synthetic Fiber Ropes is 
the only termination in our sample. A termination in the European antidumping policy 
means that while a complaint was  filed by the European industry, the Commission 
'after having looked into  the  case,  decides not  to  impose measures,  after which the 
case  is  tenninated.  Since  we  have  only  one  price-undertaking  case  and  one 
termination case,  our data do  not really allow  us to make strong inferences on the 
14 effects of  price-undertakings or tenmnations. Our results however do seem to suggest 
that price-undertakings result in higher market power changes than duties,  while a 
termination does  not lead to  a change in market power, which is what one would 
expect on the basis of theoretical predictions in the AD literature (see for example 
Veugelers and Vandenbussche, 1999). 
In order to capture a change in market power after 1997, in our analysis we 
use a dummy equal to zero for the years before protection and equal to  1 in the years 
after protection. There are several reasons why we decided not to use the exact duty 
levels  for  each case.  While  some cases  are  decided with ad-valorem duties,  others 
have  specific  duties  or  a  combination  of both.  In  cases  concluded  with  price-
undertakings,  the  level of protection is  not revealed.  This makes  it difficult  to  get 
consistent duty levels across cases. In a case involving multiple defending countries, 
each country gets a different duty level. Also, differences arise between the level of 
provisional and final duties.  The use of duty levels imposes the additional problem 
that we  would' not be able  to  report the results  for  the  Synthetic Fibre ropes  case 
separately because the duty level  for  that case  is  0%,  hence we would not  obtain 
results for the period after 1997. Moreover, the use ofthe duty levels in a case-by-case 
does not add anything compared to a dummy since in the EU there is no variation in 
the duty level over time and the duty is constant per case. 
IV. Results 
We start by reporting results  for  the pooled sample, where we pool all AD 
cases  together,  to  obtain  an idea of the  average  effect of protection on price cost 
margins.  In table 2 we show the results of estimating (7) with OLS (1), fixed effects 
(2) random effects (3)  and robust regression (4).  This latter estimation technique is 
15 one  which  controls  for  potential  outliers  in  the  data,  by weighting  observations 
according to their distance to their average in the sample.  We note that the average 
increase  in price-cost  ratios,  given  by  J.12,  is  in  the  order of 3 to  4% points  and 
significant at the 1  % level. This result holds independently of  the estiination method. 
Since the Roeger (1995) method deals with the endogeneity problem inherent in the 
Hall (1986) method, the need for using IV estimates is less of  a necessity as was also 
pointed out by Oliveira-Martins and Scarpetta (1999). This implies that the estimates 
from the methods listed in table 2 can be considered consistent. For completeness in 
the appendix in table Al we report the results where we instrument the right hand side 
variables of (7),  using the general methods of moments technique of Arellano  and 
Bond (1991).9 We note that the coefficient  J.12  is  significant and positive at the  1% 
level  suggesting there  is  an  increase  in price-cost  margins  during  the  protection 
period. However, the levels of  markup before and after protection differ substantially 
between estimation methods. From table 2 we see that the estimated price-cost margin 
lies  around 30%  before protection and is raised with about 3 to  4%  points during 
protection. Under the instrumental variable approach markups tend to be higher both 
before protection and during protection. The average increase in market power for the 
IV estimates ranges between 25% and 34% points, which seems rather high. The main 
9 Endogeneity of  the explanatory variables may occur iff  or instance productivity shocks have an effect 
on the usage of  input factors or on the payment of  wages, in which case dx may be endogenous. We use 
the general method of moments proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This method exists in using 
lagged values of  the variable that is potentially endogenous as instruments. The instruments that can be 
used are all available moment restrictions for dx dating t-2  and before, since they are not correlated 
with  the  contemporaneous  error  tenn,  but  may  be  well  correlated  with  the  contemporaneous 
explanatory variables. The model is estimated in first differences to control for potential unobserved 
fixed effects. Since we use the lagged values of the explanatory variables we generate an increasing 
number of  instruments as the panel progresses, which increases the efficiency of  the estimates. To test 
whether our instruments are valid we report a Sargan test of  over-identifYing restrictions, which is  X2 
distributed.  We  also  report  a  test  of second  order  serial  correlation,  which  is  standard  Normal 
distributed. This test is  useful to detect serial correlation, in which case a static model would not be 
valid.  Since we estimate equation (7) in this case in first differences, what matters is  the absence of 
second order serial correlation in order to have no first order serial correlation in the levels equation of 
(7). All the parameters in that case are then consistently estimated. 
16 result we are focusing on here, however, is that price-cost margins are higher during 
AD-protection than before, which is solid across specifications. 
Table 2: Estimation Results for Pooled Cases 
Dependent Variable: dYit (see equation 7) 
OLS  Fixed Effects  Random  Robust 
Effects  Re~ression 
f.11  1.32***  1.32***  1.32***  1.34*** 
(0.011)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.006) 
f.12  0.03***  0.044***  0.032***  0.031*** 
(0.012)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.007) 
f.13  -0.90**  -1.08**  -0.95**  -1.81 *** 
(0.503)  (0.577)  (0.503)  (0.303) 
/31  0.008**  0.015 ***  0.009**  0.007*** 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.002) 
/32  -0.086  -0.651 ***  -0.152  -0.322*** 
(0.182)  (0.244)  (0.186)  (0.110) 
R"  0.90  0.90  0.90  -
Hausman  test  - - 0.023  -
(P-value) 
Number  of  6855  6855  6855  6855 
observations 
Note:  The  parameter  that  captures  the  change  in market  power  after  1996  is  given  by  ~2'  The 
significance of  this parameter interests us most. 
Standard errors in brackets, ***1-** denotes statistically significant at the 1  %/5% critical level or lower. 
For  f.11  the statistical significance refers to statistically different from 1, rather than O. 
While the estimates based on the pooled sample clearly indicate an increase in 
market power as a result of  AD protection, it can be noted that the technology and the 
strategic behavior of firms may differ in the different product markets in which the 
AD investigations took place. Therefore, we also look at each case individually. We 
. will focus  our discussion on the results of the  fixed  effects model, summarized in 
table 3. 
17 Table 3: Fixed Effects Results of Estimating Market Power (equation 7)10 
Number  Before  During  R" 
ofEU  III  AD  112  AD 
firms  before  Change after 
protection  protection 
Protection cases  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Artificial corundum  67  0.76  P=MC  -0.095  P=MC  0.75 
(0.090)  (0.077) 
Cotton fabrics  182  1.42***  P>MC  0.107***  P>MC  0.91 
(0.028)  (0.038) 
Farmed Atlantic Salmon  291  1.14***  P>MC  0.157**  P>MC  0.71 
(0.056)  (0.07» 
Seamless  Pipes  and  98  0.989  P-MC  -0.02  P=MC  0.80 
Tubes  (0.058)  (0.06) 
Polyester  Fiber  and  99  1.37***  P>MC  0.128**  P>MC  0.86 
yams  (0.04)  (0.06) 
Stainless steel fastener  762  1.40***  P>MC  0.03**  P>MC  0.94 
(0.015)  (0.016) 
Termination Case 
Synthetic Fiber Ropes  155  1.25***  P>MC  0.052  P>MC  0.94 
(0.039)  (0.044) 
Note: in brackets you fmd the standard deviation. *** indicates significance at the  I % level, **  at the 
5% level.  If III  is  statistically different from  I  this  is  equivalent to  a  consumer price that exceeds 
marginal cost 
The estimates of the full model based on OLS  and Fixed Effects  estimation 
techniques are reported in the appendix on a case-by-case basis. It will become clear 
that our result of increased market power as  a result of antidumping protection is 
robust across cases and across specifications.  I I 
10  Markups in Europe tend to be higher than in the  US.  A study by Oliveira-Martins and Scarpetta 
(1999) comparing markups in the manufacturing sector in the US  versus the EU over a period of 20 
years fmds  US markups in the range of 10-15%, while European markups are in the range of 15  to 
30%. The European figures corresponds quite well with the magnitude of  the markups we find for our 
set of  European industries. 
11  Markets in Europe may be segmented along national borders. Therefore the number of  firms does not 
necessarily reflect the intensity of  competition. 
18 Column 2 of table 3 suggests that prior to antidumping protection, two products have 
prices  close  to  marginal  cost.  The  two  products  facing  tough  competition  are 
'Artificial Corundum' that belongs to the Chemical industry, and 'Seamless pipes and 
tubes' that belongs to the Steel industry. For those products, we observe from Table 3 
that the effect of antidumping protection does not have an impact at all on price-cost 
margins.  These results correspond with the theoretical prediction that in competitive 
markets, tariff protection does not affect markups. This may suggest that in Chemicals 
and Steel, domestic European competition is sufficient to discipline prices, even after 
protection. Also, from Table 1 we recall that the import share of  the named countries, 
for  example in the  'Artificial corundum'  case was relatively small compared to the 
other cases. The competitive situation in the market even after antidumping protection 
could  be  due  to  a  sufficient  amount  of imports  originating  from  non-dumping 
countries.  An  alternative  explanation  could  be  the  low  degree  of  product 
differentiation in the chemical sector. Homogeneous products make it more likely for 
competition to  be tough and prices to be close to marginal cost. For the 'Seamless 
pipes and tubes' however, the source of competition is likely to be largely domestic 
since the import share of the non-named countries is relatively small. The steel sector 
is known for its overcapacity world wide, and its large amount of  state aid, at least in 
the past, usually in terms of  subsidies, which are likely to keep consumer prices low. 
From column (2) in table 3 it seems that the other industries are characterized 
by imperfect competition prior to protection with prices all exceeding marginal costs. 
We also can note that the initial price-cost margin is different in different sectors. 
In the  'Farmed  Atlantic  Salmon'  case  we  find  a  positive  markup  before 
protection and the highest increase in markup during antidumping protection. Farmed 
Atlantic Salmon is the only agricultural product in our sample and only one country 
19 was under investigation for dumping into the EU namely Norway. Table 1 shows that 
in 1996, Norway had an import share both in values  and in tons of about 93% of 
'Farmed  Atlantic  Salmon'  in  the  EU.  Hence,  potential  import  diversion  after 
protection is  very limited.  Given that Norway seems to  be almost the  only source 
country for  the  imports of Farmed Atlantic  Salmon,  other extra-EU importers will 
benefit little from Norway's conviction. This no doubt makes it easier for European 
producers of Salmon to raise their prices after antidumping protection, knowing that 
other extra-EU importers have only very small market shares in the EU and cannot 
discipline the market after Norway's conviction.  While total Norwegian imports in 
1996 was about 500 million ECU, total sales of the 309 EU farmers was about 1.2 
billion  USD  (=1.2  billion  ECU).  The  fact  that  this  case  was  settled  for  many 
Norwegian  importers  with the  acceptance  of price-undertakings,  could  be  another 
additional reason why the change in market power is large. 
It is also interesting to point out the results for  'Synthetic Fiber Ropes'. This 
AD  case was  terminated without  imposing  a duty.  While  our estimates  indicate a 
positive market  power before  protection, we  do  not  find  a  statistically significant 
increase in price-cost margins  during antidumping protection. However,  we do  not 
want to focus too much on these results given that 'Synthetic Fiber Ropes' is the only 
'Termination' case in our sample. Although in 1996 in total 5 cases were terminated, 
the 4 other termination cases did not give us enough information to be used. 
A few additional remarks are in order here. Of course an increase in markups 
can be the result of  two distinct causes. Either price has increased or costs have gone 
down. (Marginal) Cost data are not revealed in the AD case investigations. However, 
theoretically we  have strong  arguments  to  believe that prices  go  up  as  a result of 
protection. It is far less clear in what direction costs move with protection. Most likely 
20 costs will not go down with protection. This would suggest that the increase in market 
power that we find is mainly due to an increase in consumer prices. 
Our  findings  are  also  consistent  with  earlier  work  that  shows  little  or no 
effects  of  so  called  import  diversion  in  response  to  AD  protection.  Konings, 
Vandenbussche  and  Springael  (1999)  show that  for  all  antidumping cases initiated 
between 1985 and 1990 there was no trade diversion from the alleged dumpers on to 
other  existing  or  new  importers  into  the  European  Union,  suggesting  that  the 
antidumping mechanism works well  in keeping imports out.  The results we report 
here of  increased markups after protection for the EU industry is consistent with this 
earlier finding of  relatively low import diversion as a result of  protection. 
V. Robustness Tests 
The PCM-method 
The price-cost margin PCM-method is  an  alternative method to  estimate the 
effect of a change in the trade regime on firms'  markups (Tybout, 2001). Using the 
PCM method translates into the following regression 
The dependent variable PCMu is variable profits measured as  firm level sales minus 
material costs  and labor costs divided by the  sales figure.  The  second term on the 
RHS is the firm level capital stock (KiD  over firm level sales. The next term AD is a 
dummy in each case from  1997 onwards and GDPjt is the yearly gdp growth rate for 
each country j in the sample. The results on the pooled sample of  AD cases based on 
6,140 observations are shown in table 4 below where we report the results of a fixed 
21 effects model and of robust regression. By using the fixed effects estimation method 
we  control for  finn and  sector heterogeneity such as  differences in technology. The 
robust regression attributes less weight to  outliers. In the PCM regression we also 
included  finn  level  market  shares  (Mshareitrto  control  for  finn  level  efficiency 
related variation in markups.  The results reported in table 4 suggest that the  effect 
antidumping  protection  is  positive  and  significant.  While  the  magnitude  of the 
increase in markup  differs  across  estimations,  the basic  result we are  interested in 
namely the change in market power during antidumping protection, captured by Y2, is 
significant which is reassuring. 
Table 4: Estimation of the PCM method 
PCM  Fixed Effects  Robust Reeression 
¥1  -0.016***  0.07*** 
(0.01)  (0.004) 
12  0.005***  0.027*** 
(0.001)  (0.003) 
¥3  0.44*  -0.805*** 
(0.23)  (0.16) 
¥4  -0.03  -1.78*** 
(0.083)  (0.14) 
Number of  observations  6140  6139 
Our PCM results confinn the cOurIter-cyc1icality of price cost margins also fOurId in 
other studies (Oliveira-Martins and Scarpetta,  1999). The negative coefficient 11  on 
the variable capital over sales (Ki/Pit.Qit) has also been fOurId in other PCM studies as 
discussed in Schmalensee (1989). 
The  reason  for  constructing  our  own  measures  of variable  profit  as  a 
dependent variable in the PCM method instead of  using the accounting profits is that 
accourIting  profits  may  not  be  a  good  measure  of economic  profits  (Fisher  and 
22 McGowan  (1983».  However,  as  an  extra  robustness  test  we  check  the  average 
accounting profit margin before and  after 1996  to  see whether average  accounting 
profits are different in the period before and during protection. The accounting profit 
margin in our company dataset Amadeus is defined as  'company profits before tax 
over operating revenue'. While we [md the average in the period 1991-1996 to be 
2.5% with a standard deviation of 0.075, in the period 1997-99 we find the average 
accounting profit margin to equal 4.1 % with a standard deviation of 0.075. Running 
the PCM regression, now using the accounting profit as a dependent variable yielded 
a positive and significant coefficient in the fixed  effects regression at a significance 
level  of I %,  suggesting  a  positive  effect  of antidumping  protection  on company 
accounting profits. 
A Counter/actual Control group: 
In order to make sure that the significant increase in market power we obtain 
for the firms located in one of  the ED-15 countries is not simply a time or an industry 
effect, we construct a counterfactual. This control group we use is composed of  firms 
in  the  same  industries  but  in  countries  outside  the  ED-I5  namely  Norway, 
Switzerland  and  Iceland.  However,  in  one  antidumping  case,  Farmed  Atlantic 
Salmon,  Norway was  involved as  the  defendant  country.  Many of the  Norwegian 
importers of  Farmed Atlantic Salmon obtained price-undertakings for their sales into 
the ED market. Price-undertakings are known to be a collusive device which may not 
only raise the market power of  European producers but also of  foreign firms active on 
the European market (Vandenbussche and Wauthy, 2001).  For this reason we decided 
not to  include the Norwegian firms  involved in the  'Farmed Atlantic  Salmon case' 
into our counterfactual. The results for the PCM method on the counterfactual can be 
23 found  in the table 5 below.  Under the fixed  effects  specification we do  not find  a 
significant increase after 1997  on firms'  markups.  This again seems to  confirm the 
results in the core of  the paper namely that the increase in market power in the EU-15 
countries was actually driven by European Union's common antidumpingpolicy. 
Table 5: Estimation of the PCM method for the counterfactual Norway, Iceland 
Switzerland 
PCM  Fixed Effects  Robust Regression 
Y1  0.026***  0.077*** 
(0.005)  (0.004) 
Y2  0.0008  0.007 
(0.005)  (0.006) 
Y3  0.038  -0.108 
(0.092)  (0.074) 
Y4  0.013  -0.006 
(0.037)  (0.05) 
Number of  observations  1833  1833 
VI. Conclusion 
In this  paper we  document  empirically  the  evolution  of market  power in 
European  antidumping  cases.  For  this  purpose  we  used  very  detailed  company 
accounts data of 1,666 European firms involved in nine European Antidumping cases 
initiated in the year 1996. The company accounts data run from 1991-1999, allowing 
us  to  study the evolution of market power both before and after antidumping duty 
protection. We hereby used the Roeger (1995) method. We found that for the pooled 
sample of  firms in our data, market power of  European firms is on average about 3 to 
4% points higher during antidumping protection, compared to before. The finding that 
price-cost  margins  increase  with  protection  appears  to  be  very  robust  across 
specifications (OLS, fixed  effects, random effects,  robust regression).  On a case-by 
24 case basis we find that in those industries where market power before protection is 
low, antidumping duty protection has little effect on markups. While industries where 
prices  are well above  marginal cost before protection, benefited most in terms  of 
market  power  increases  after  protection  with  changes  in  market  power  ranging 
between 3 to 15% points depending on the sector. 
Our  results  suggest  that  in  the  majority  of EU  AD  cases  protection  is 
associated  with a reduction  of allocative  efficiency,  reflected  in increased prices, 
which has a negative impact on European consumer welfare. However, in this paper 
we  did not investigate the potential impact of AD protection on employment  and 
wages, which could also enter the welfare objective of  the EU. The empirical analysis 
of how  price-cost margins  may jointly be determined with wage  setting  in labor 
markets is an interesting avenue for further research. 
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29 Appendix 
Table AI: Estimation Results for the Pooled Cases 
General Method of Moments IV Estimators (Fixed Effects Model) 
dYit =  a i  + f.lldx" +  f.l2dx" x AD +  J1 3dx"  x GD~t  + /lIAD +  /l2GD~t + '1/" 
Fil[ed effects (IV, GMM) 
f.ll  1.48***(0.16) 
f.l2  0.21 *** (0.16) 
f.l3  -10.58***(7.6) 
/ll  0.002 (0.007) 
/l2  -1.370***(0.41 ) 
RI  0.82 
Sargan test of  over-identification  0.68 
(P-value) 
Second Order Serial Correlation  0.941 
Test 
.. 
Note: two-step robust standard errors m brackets, *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% cntIcal 
level or lower. Instruments include moment restrictions from t-2 and before for d.x The Sargan test of 
over identifying restrictions is X2  distributed and the test for second order serial correlation follows as 
standard normal distribution. 
Table A2: Estimation Results for Artificial Corundum 
OLS  Fixed Effects 
J11  0.70 (0.08)  0.73 (0.09) 
J12  -0.06  (0.06)  -0.09 (0.07) 
J13  12.65*** (3.28)  12.21 ***(3.8) 
/ll  0.006 (0.026)  -0.002 (0.029) 
/l2  -1.27 (1.01)  -1.76 (1.21) 
R"  0.75  0.75 
Number of  321  321 
observations 
..  Note: standard errors ill brackets, *** denotes stalIstically slgruficant at the 1  % cntIcallevel or lower, 
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% critical level. 
Table A3: Estimation Results for Cotton Fabrics 
OLS  Fixed Effects 
J11  1.43 ***(0.025)  1.42***(0.028) 
J12  0.055**(0.033)  0.107***(0.038) 
J13  -1.64 (1.24)  -1.78 (1.41) 
/ll  0.026 ***(0.0 I)  0.036*** (0.01) 
/l2  0.025 (0.42)  -0.41 (0.50) 
R"  0.91  0.91 
Number of  873  873 
observations 
..  Note: standard errors ill brackets, *** denotes statistically SIgnIficant at the 1  % cntIcallevel or lower, 
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% critical level. 
30 Table A4: Estimation Results for Synthetic Fibre Ropes 
OLS  Fixed Effects 
~I  1.27***(0.03)  1.25***(0.039) 
~2  0.026 (0.04)  0.052 (0.044) 
~l  -1.80 (1.6)  -1.71 (1.88) 
PI  0.012 (0.015)  0.012 (0.018) 
P2  -0.64 (0.59)  -1.54**(0.85) 
R'  0.94  0.94 
Number of  591  591 
observations  ..  Note: standard errors ill brackets, *** denotes statIstIcally sIgnIficant at the  1% cntIcallevel or lower, 
*' denotes statistically significant at the 5% critical level. 
Table AS: Estimation Results for Farmed Atlantic Salmon 
OLS  Fixed Effects 
~I  1.134***(0.05)  1.14***(0.056) 
~2  0.073 (0.06)  0.157***(0.073) 
~l  -0.69 (2.44)  -2.88 (2.78) 
PI  0.022 (0.017)  0.033*(0.020) 
P2  -0.73 (0.68)  -2.26**(1.00) 
R  0.71  0.71 
Number of  978  978 
observations 
Note: standard errors in brackets, *** denotes statistically significant at the 1  % critical level or lower, 
*' denotes statistically significant at the 5% critical level. 
Table A6: Estimation Results for Seamless Steel Pipes and Tubes 
OLS  Fixed Effects 
~I  1.02 (0.05)  0.98 (0.058) 
~2  0.011 (0.05)  -0.020 (0.06) 
~l  4.11 ** (2.21)  6.59***(2.51 ) 
PI  0.020 (0.019)  0.022 (0.020) 
P2  0.23 (0.75)  -0.25 (0.95) 
R  0.78  0.78 
Number of  492  492 
observations  ..  Note: standard  errors ill brackets, *** denotes statIstIcally sIgnIficant at the  1% cntIcallevel or lower, 
*'denotesstatistically significant at the 5% critical level. 
31 Table A 7: Estimation Results for Polyester Fibres and Yarns 
OLS  Fixed Effects 
f.il  1.37*** (0.044)  1.37***(0.048) 
f.i2  0.11 ** (0.055)  0.128**(0.060) 
f.i3  -5.28***(L94)  -6.18***(2.14) 
/31  0.016 (0.013)  0.021 * (0.014) 
/32  -0.57 (0.56)  -1.31 **(0.67) 
R'  0.86  0.86 
Number of  446  446 
observations 
Note: standard errors in brackets, *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% critical level or lower, 
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% critical level. 
Table AS: Estimation Results for Stainless Steel Fasteners 
OLS  Fixed Effects 
f.il  1.40***(0.013)  1.40***(0.015) 
f.i2  0.018* (0.001)  0.03**(0.016) 
f.i3  -1.12* (0.59)  -1.35**(0.68) 
/31  -0.003 (0.006)  0.005 (0.007) 
/32  0.012 (0.24)  -0.39 (0.34) 
R'  0.94  0.94 
Number of  3122  3122 
observations 
Note: standard errors in brackets, *** denotes statistically significant at the 1  % critical level or lower, 
** denotes statistically significant at the 5% critical level. 
32 Data Appendix 
Construction of  the data set 
The data that we use are based on all European AD cases that were initiated in 
the European Union in 1996. The final-data set covers 9 different cases and more than 
1,666 European firms for which usable information on sales and input usage needed 
for the analysis could be retrieved.  For most of  the cases only the firms that filed the 
complaints are mentioned in the Official Journal reports of  the European Commission. 
However, once protection is granted, all EU firms producing the product benefit from 
protection. The data source that we used to obtain the company account information is 
the Amadeus database. This is a commercial database covering all medium and large 
sized European companies.12  In order to compose our sample of firms for which we 
are relatively certain they would be affected by antidumping protection we proceeded 
in various steps. 
We first  traced the  companies that were mentioned in the filing  of a  case 
reported in the Official Journal published by the European Commission. We identified 
the 7-digit CSO activity code\3 corresponding to the product that was under the AD 
investigation.  However,  the  sample  of firms  involved  in  the  formulation  of the 
antidumping complaint was too small. To expand our sample of EU firms we turned 
to a property of  the antidumping legislation which is that when protection is granted it 
does not only apply to the firms that actually filed a complaint but it applies to all EU 
firms producing that particular product. Hence, we retrieved all EU firms that had in 
their description of activities that partiCUlar 7-digit CSO code. This still resulted in a 
12 For companies located in the UK, Germany, France and Italy, firms are included that satisfY at least 
of the  following  criteria:  the number of employees  larger than  150,  operating  revenue  at  least  15 
million Euro and total assets of at least 30 million Euro. For the companies located in other countries 
these criteria collapse to  100 employees, operating revenue of at least 20 million Euro and total assets 
of  at least 100 million Euro. 
33 relatively small number of firms.  To  increase  the  sample  size more,  we identified 
from our initial sample of complaining firms, the four-digit primary CSO codes. This 
corresponds with an  aggregation within the  product/activity line.  We  retrieved the 
company accounts of these firms between 1991  and 1999. This allowed us to have a 
period before protection and  a period during  which protection was  in place which 
would  allow  us  to  compare  market power of these  firms  both before  and  during 
protection. 
Measurement of  the Variables 
Pit .Qit:  Firm level operating revenue in each year, source: Amadeus 
Rit Kit: Book value of  tangible fixed assets for each firm in each year times the price of 
capital, Rit , defined as 
(8) 
PI :  the price index of investment goods for plant and machinery, measured at the 
country level.  The  data  stem  from  the AMECO-database  from  the  ECFIN 
department at the European Commission. Weare grateful to  Wemer Roeger 
for providing this data. 
RI:  stands for the real interest rate in each country. The data stem from the ECFIN 
department  at  the  European  Commission.  We  thank  Wemer  Roeger  for 
making these data available to us. 
15:  stands for the depreciation rate, measured at the firm level (total depreciation 
divided  by  tangible  fixed  assets);  source:  own  computations  based  on 
Amadeus 
13 The CSO code is a product code that is used by the British Statistical Office and dermes the activities 
of  firms at a 7  -digit level of  detail. 
34 Wit Lit:  total  wage  bill  in  the  finn  consIstmg  of the  price  of labor  (h)  times 
employnrrent(L) ;source:AJaadeus 
PitM Mit:  total material costs in the finn consisting of  the price of  materials (PM) times 
materials (M) ; source: AJaadeus 
GDP growth:  growth rate in gross domestic product in each country; source: OECD 
Main Economic Indicators 
Anti-Dumping Cases:  source:  'The Official Journal of the European Union' various 
issues  in the  'C-series'  for  notifications  of case  initiations  and  the  'L-series'  for 
reports on the final decisions. 
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